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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SORENSON'S RANCH SCHOOL and 
SHAUN SORENSON, 
Appellees, 
v. 
RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20000993-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
The State of Utah appeals from a final order of the Sixth 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiffs and denying the State of Utah's motion for summary 
judgment regarding the correct interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 62A-4a-413 (Supp. 2000). The matter came before the district 
court on appeal from an informal adjudicative proceeding of a 
state agency. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 2000). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the district court erred in its interpretation of 
section 62A-4a-413 when, contrary to principles of statutory 
construction, it concluded that the only felons prohibited from 
employment in a program licensed to serve children are felons who 
provide direct services to the children. This issue was 
preserved in the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and its 
accompanying Memorandum in Support. (R. 35-48), as well as 
during oral argument on the motion (see transcript dated August 
29, 2000). 
Standard of review: On appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, the appellate court views the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non moving party and affirms only if there 
are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment was based on statutory interpretation, 
the appellate court reviews the question of statutory 
interpretation under a correction-of-error standard. Graham v. 
Davis Co. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Service 
Dist. , 1999 UT App 136 1(7, 979 P.2d 363, 367. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413 (Supp. 2000). 
(Addendum A ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1992, Appellee Shaun Sorenson was convicted of two 
felonies in California. Shaun Sorenson is employed with Appellee 
Sorenson's Ranch School, a youth program licensed by the 
Defendant State of Utah, Department of Human Services, Office of 
Licensing. On January 30, 1998, the Office of Licensing issued a 
Notice of Agency Action to Sorenson's Ranch School, notifying the 
2 
program that Shaun Sorenson did not pass the criminal background 
screening requirement found in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413. The 
agency action required that either Shaun Sorenson's employment be 
terminated, or that further licensing sanctions would follow. 
The informal administrative proceeding that followed upheld the 
agency's action based on its interpretation of the statute. The 
Appellees appealed to the district court. Because the only 
issue was one of statutory interpretation, the parties filed 
motions for summary judgment regarding the correct interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. section 62A-4a-413. In a ruling entered 
September 25, 2000, the district court granted the Sorensons' 
cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the State's summary 
judgment motion. The State Defendants appealed, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sorenson's Ranch School is a youth program1 that provides 
services to youth under a license issued by the State of Utah, 
A "youth program" is defined as "a nonresidential program 
designed to provide behavioral, substance abuse, or mental health 
services to minors that: 
(a) serves either adjudicated or nonadjudicated youth; 
(b) charges a fee for its services; 
(c) may or may not provide host homes or other arrangements 
for overnight accommodation of the youth; 
(d) may or may not provide all or part of its services in 
the outdoors; 
(e) may or may not limit or censor access to parents or 
guardians; 
(f) prohibits or restricts a minor's ability to leave the 
program at any time of his own free will; and 
(g) will not apply to recreational programs such as Boy 
Scouts, Girl Scouts, 4-H, and other such organizations." 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-101(20) (Supp. 2000). 
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Department of Human Services, Office of Licensing (Licensing). 
(R. 2, 24, 38; T. 13). In 1992, Shaun Sorenson was convicted of 
two felonies in California. Shaun Sorenson, the son of the 
Sorenson's Ranch School owner, became employed, at some point, as 
a plumber-maintenance worker with the program. He provided full-
time plumbing and construction services. (R. 66). On January 
30, 1998, Licensing issued a Notice of Agency Action requiring 
either the termination of Shaun Sorenson's employment or 
sanctions against the license of Sorenson's Ranch School based on 
Shaun Sorenson's convicted felon status. (R. 10, 53).2 
The Sorensons requested an informal administrative hearing 
to contest the agency action. (R. 53). Licensing motioned to 
dismiss the hearing request on the basis that no disputed issues 
of fact existed to justify a hearing in light of Licensing's 
statutory mandate that felons may not be employed in programs 
licensed to serve children. (R. 12, 53). 
On February 18, 1998, the Office of Administrative Hearings, 
Department of Human Services (OAH), issued an order dismissing 
the Sorensons' hearing request on the basis that Shaun Sorenson 
was convicted of two felonies in the State of California and, 
therefore, no disputed issue of fact existed to require a hearing 
under the administrative hearing rules. (R. 13-16, 53). 
2
 In 1992, Shaun Sorenson was convicted of two felonies in 
the State of California for driving under the influence resulting 
in accident, injury, and hit-and-run. (R. 54). 
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The Sorensons requested reconsideration and OAH granted the 
motion on the grounds that an issue of fact existed as to whether 
Shaun Sorenson provided services or care to children in his 
employment with Sorenson's Ranch School. The order stated that 
reconsideration would take the form of a hearing and that the 
parties would be notified once it was scheduled. (R. 17-19, 53-
54) . 
Subsequently, both parties briefed the legal issue of 
whether Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413 precludes the licensing of 
any facility which employs an individual who does not pass the 
criminal background screening or whether that provision only 
precludes the employment of such individuals when they deal 
directly with children. (R. 7, 54). 
On January 8, 1999, OAH issued an Order denying the 
Sorensons' Request for Reconsideration. In this ruling, OAH 
concluded that: 
[t]he only sound interpretation of U.C.A. § 62A-4a-413 
mandates that youth facilities licensed by Claimant may 
not employee [sic] persons who do not pass the criminal 
background screening whether they work directly with 
children, or, as in this case, work as custodians or in 
other positions which do not require direct interaction 
with children. The undersigned agrees with Claimant 
that the act must be analyzed in its entirety. The 
Legislature passed this Act with the specific purpose 
of protecting children. 
By including both "employee" and "providers of care" in 
the statute the Legislature meant to protect children 
from all persons who would have access to them. 
Custodians, cooks, and other "employees" working in 
youth programs have access to children. Indeed at 
5 
times they may have greater and more secluded access to 
children than ''providers of care" such as therapists. 
(R. 7-9). 
The Sorensons appealed the OAH ruling by filing a Complaint 
in district court for a de novo review as provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-15. (R. 1-19). The State Defendants and the 
Sorensons agreed to proceed by summary judgment motions to 
resolve the statutory interpretation dispute. (R. 32-34). The 
State Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 
6, 1999. (R. 35-48). The sorensons filed a Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment on November 22, 1999. (R. 49-65). The parties 
argued the summary judgment motions on August 29, 2000. (R. 76-
78). The district court, without providing any explanation of 
its underlying analysis, granted the Sorensons' motion and denied 
the State Defendants' motion in a ruling entered September 25, 
2000. (R. 85-87). The State Defendants filed their notice of 
appeal on October 16, 2000. (R. 92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State licensing entity is charged with the 
responsibility to check the criminal backgrounds of a wide 
variety of individuals associated with programs licensed to serve 
children. The legislature determined that no felons should be 
associated with these programs in any capacity under the license 
issued by the State. 
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Appellees Shaun Sorenson, a felon, and his employer, 
Sorenson's Ranch School, challenged the State's interpretation of 
the unambiguous statute. The trial court erroneously granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, adopting their 
tortured reading of the statute. 
Although both "employees" and "providers of care" are 
prohibited from providing any aspect of a youth program when a 
felony appears in their criminal background, the trial court 
ignored the specific distinction between these terms and merged 
them in its statutory interpretation. The court determined that 
only felons who provide direct services to children are 
prohibited from employment with the licensed program even though 
the statute itself does not draw the same distinctions. The 
court's skewed interpretation rendered the statute meaningless. 
The trial court's ruling is contrary to accepted and sound 
principles of statutory construction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING AN INTERPRETATION 
OF SECTION 62A-4a-413 THAT RENDERS THE STATUTE 
MEANINGLESS BY ALLOWING FELONS TO BE EMPLOYED BY 
PROGRAMS LICENSED TO SERVE CHILDREN. 
The State appeals the district court's ruling granting 
summary judgment in favor of Shaun Sorenson and Sorenson's Ranch 
School (the Sorensons) and denying summary judgment as to the 
State Defendants. Although the district court provided no 
written explanation of its underlying rationale, it essentially 
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adopted the Sorensons' interpretation of section 62A-4a-413 and 
rejected the State's. The Sorensons' interpretation of the 
statute allows Shaun Sorenson, a convicted felon, to continue to 
be employed in a youth program licensed to serve children. The 
State challenges that statutory interpretation adopted by the 
district court. 
A. The Trial Court's Interpretation of 62A-4a-413 
Renders Portions Of The Statute Superfluous, Contrary 
to Statutory Interpretation Principles. 
Section 62A-4a-413 provides: 
(1)(a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private 
agency or individual licensed by the department to 
provide child placing services, youth programs, 
substitute, foster, or institutionalized care to 
children shall, in order to obtain or renew a license 
under Section 62A-2-108, submit to the department the 
name and other identifying information, which may 
include fingerprints, of new and proposed: 
(i) owners; 
(ii) directors; 
(iii) members of the governing 
body; 
(iv) employees; 
(v) providers of care; and 
(vi) volunteers, except parents of 
children enrolled in the 
programs. 
(b) The Criminal Investigations and Technical 
Services Division of the Department of Public 
Safety, established in Section 53-10-103, 
shall process that information to determine 
whether the individual has been convicted of 
any crime. 
(c) If an individual has not lived in Utah 
for five years, the individual shall submit 
fingerprints for a FBI national criminal 
history record check. The fingerprints shall 
be submitted to the FBI through the Criminal 
Investigations and Technical Services 
Division. 
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(2) An owner, director, member of the governing body, 
employee, provider of care, or volunteer who has a 
felony conviction may not provide child placing 
services, foster care, youth programs, substitute care, 
or institutionalized care for children in facilities or 
programs licensed by the department. 
(3) The office shall adopt rules defining the 
circumstances under which an owner, director, member of 
the governing body, employee, provider of care, or 
volunteer who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may 
provide services described in Subsection (1)(a). 
(emphasis added). 
The first paragraph defines who must submit to a criminal 
background check, and the second paragraph provides that if any 
of those same individuals has a felony conviction, the felon may 
not provide "child placing services, foster care, youth programs, 
substitute care, or institutionalized care for children in 
facilities and programs licensed by the department." Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-4a-413 (Supp. 1997). Although the second paragraph is 
not a model of clarity, it is clear that both employees and 
providers of care are prohibited from providing "youth programs" 
if either individual has a felony conviction. 
In a nutshell, the statute provides that, in order to be 
licensed as a program to serve children, a broad group of 
individuals associated with the program must submit their names 
for purposes of criminal background screening. Once that 
screening is completed, if an individual has a felony conviction 
of any type, that person may not be associated with the licensed 
program in any of the capacities described in paragraph (1). 
9 
The State's position is simple and is based on sound 
principles of statutory construction: section 62A-4a-413 
prohibits a convicted felon, like Shaun Sorenson, from being 
employed by a program licensed to serve children. Throughout the 
proceedings below, the Sorensons argued that, under their 
interpretation of the statute, the phrase "may not provide . . . 
youth programs" in paragraph (3) means may not provide direct 
services to children. Therefore, the Sorensons claim that only 
felons who provide those "direct services" to children are 
prohibited from employment in the licensed youth program. (R. 
56-62; T. 10-11, 17, 20). However, because the Sorensons1 
interpretation would render parts of the statute meaningless or 
superfluous, their interpretation is legally flawed. 
If the Sorensons' interpretation were adopted, the terms 
"employees" and "providers of care" would be merged and the term 
"employee" rendered meaningless. Of the categories listed in 
subsection (1), the "provider of care" category clearly describes 
individuals who provide "direct services" to children. If the 
legislature's sole concern was individuals who provide "direct 
services" to children, they could have easily specified such an 
intent. Instead, the legislature included categories of 
individuals, in addition to "providers of care," such as owners, 
directors, members of the governing body, employees and 
volunteers. Thus, the requirement to check the criminal 
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background of an '"employee" becomes superfluous if only the 
criminal background of a "provider of care" is pertinent. 
Proper statutory construction requires statutes to be 
construed so that effect is given to all their provisions, "so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another." 
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah App. 1998). 
By interpreting the language "provide youth programs" as 
equivalent to provision of "direct services," the lower court has 
rendered the statute as a whole meaningless. Members of a 
governing body do not, by definition, provide direct services to 
consumers in a program. See Utah Admin, Code, R501-2-3. The 
lower court's interpretation essentially merges the terms 
"employee" and "provider of care." Thus the lower court has 
ignored the accepted statutory construction principles which 
require harmonizing the statute as a whole in light of the 
statute's intent and purpose. 
B. The Purpose Of The Statute Is To Protect Children, 
Although the statutory language at issue is not ambiguous, 
the legislative intent provides additional insight to this Court. 
If there is doubt about the meaning of an act, uit is appropriate 
to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, 
and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and 
purpose." State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah App. 
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1997) (quoting State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 
1993); see also Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior. 907 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1995); Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
County, 913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1995); State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 
695 (Utah App. 1997); O'Keefe v. Utah St. Retirement Bd., 929 
P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Chmdgren. 777 P.2d 527 
(Utah App. 1989). 
This statute is clearly intended to protect children. In 
addition to the language of section 62A-4a-413, one need only 
look at the surrounding statutes to glean the legislature's 
underlying intent and purpose. Section 62A-4a-413 appears in the 
Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Requirements section, and the 
legislative purpose of protecting children is clearly articulated 
in section 62A-4a-401. See State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 
1097 ("we read a statute to harmonize it with related statutes . 
. .; "statutes must be interpreted harmoniously with other 
statutes relevant to the subject matter.") (citations omitted). 
The interpretation espoused by the Sorensons is that only 
employees who provide "direct services" to children are covered 
by paragraph 2. For example, under the Sorensons1 
interpretation, an employee designated as a cook, an absentee 
owner who walks through the facility once a month, or a janitor 
or maintenance worker would not be subject to criminal background 
screening. However, such individuals would clearly have access to 
the youth/children. 
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The statute does not mention "direct services" anywhere, but 
does state that both employees and providers of care in programs 
licensed by the department are subject to criminal background 
screening. The statute also states that employees and providers 
of care with felony convictions are prohibited from providing 
"youth programs." A reasonable interpretation of the phrase 
"providing youth programs" is that anyone employed by the program 
serving youth is included. 
By including both the terms "employee" and "providers of 
care," the legislature clearly intended to protect children from 
all persons associated with a program who might have access to 
children. In other words, the statute presumes access. Any 
other interpretation would render this statute meaningless and 
would result in the serious consequence of placing children at 
risk. Every individual or employee who is involved with the 
operation of the program is part of the network providing 
"services" to benefit the youth/children in the program and, more 
importantly, has access to the children. 
A contrary interpretation would render the separate use of 
the terms "employee" and "providers of care" inoperative and 
superfluous. The use of both terms indicate a legislative 
purpose toward restricting "access" to children, rather than 
13 
distinguishing between those who provide services and those who 
do not.3 
Furthermore, if the Sorensons' interpretation were adopted, 
the statute would become confusing at best. The Sorensons' 
interpretation would require a background check of an employee 
which would never even be used. This scenario would simply 
create additional liability for an agency which would then have 
knowledge of an employee's criminal background, but would be 
unable to act upon that knowledge. 
The statute creates a duty for State Licensing to research 
criminal backgrounds for the protection of children. If 
Licensing has knowledge through a background screening that a 
program employs a convicted child abuser, and Licensing knows the 
3
 The legislative history of this provision supports the 
State's interpretation. (See Addendum D). In 1990, the statute 
(then numbered 62A-4-514) required criminal background screening 
of only employees, providers of care and volunteers to the 
department. Paragraph 3 regarding misdemeanor convictions 
referred to "employment" with the licensed programs. In 1991, 
"youth programs" were added to the list of programs and the 
category of "volunteers to the department" was modified to read 
simply "volunteers." In 1995, owners, directors, and members of 
the governing body were added to the list of individuals 
screened. Paragraph 3 regarding misdemeanor convictions was 
modified to delete the narrower concept of employment and replace 
it with "provide . . . any youth program." In 1998, paragraph 3 
was rewritten to specify that individuals with certain 
misdemeanors may not "provide the services described in 
Subsection (1) (a),'1 in essence, treating the entire youth program 
as a specified "service." 
With the later addition of owners, directors, and governing 
board members, and with the change from an employment focus to 
the broader focus of "providing" a program, this history 
demonstrates that "access" - rather than provision of direct 
services - is the driving force behind this statute. 
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employee has potential access to children - regardless of whether 
his job description contemplates actual provision of "direct 
services" to children - Licensing could be subject to liability 
if a child in the program is victimized. Cf. C.T. v. Martinez, 
845 P.2d 246, 247-48 (Utah 1992) (although statute may create a 
"special relationship giving rise to a tort duty of care," 
negligence claim against a licensing entity failed because 
statutory requirements in effect at the time did not require a 
criminal record check). 
In sum, adopting an interpretation of section 62A-4a-413 
that renders the terms "employee" and "providers of care" 
superfluous or meaningless contravenes basic principles of 
statutory construction. The legislature is presumed to use 
statutory terms advisedly. C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, %9, 977 
P.2d 479, 481; Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306; Olsen 
v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998); Reedeker 
v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1998) . The legislature 
could have easily specified that only felons who provided "direct 
services" to the children in the program were barred from 
employment. Instead, the legislature included the broader 
category of "employees," as well as the service-provider category 
-- "providers of care" --in its prohibition.4 To interpret the 
4
 The idea of barring all felons from certain activities or 
positions, regardless of the type of felony and its connection to 
the position sought, is not without precedent. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 7-1-508 (prohibiting felons from serving as officers, 
15 
statute any other way frustrates the legislature's intent and 
purpose to protect children, and thereby places children at risk. 
ORAL ARGUMENT; PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
The State requests oral argument and a published opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees and grant judgment in 
favor of the State based on its interpretation of section 62A-4a-
413. 
DATED this 7 day of May, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEPP 
Attorney General 
CAROL L. C. VERDOIA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
directors, or employees of a depository institutions) and 46-3-
201(1) (b) (prohibiting felons from being employed as operative 
personnel with a certification authority regarding notarization 
and authentication of documents and digital signatures) (Supp. 
2000) . 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
62A-4a-413. Agencies and individuals providing services to 
children -- Felony or misdemeanor conviction. 
(1)(a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private agency 
or individual licensed by the department to provide 
child placing services, youth programs, substitute, 
foster, or institutionalized care to children shall, in 
order to obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-
108, submit to the department the name and other 
identifying information, which may include 
fingerprints, of new and proposed: 
(i) owners; 
(ii) directors; 
(iii)members of the governing body; 
(iv) employees; 
(v) providers of care; and 
(vi) volunteers, except parents of children enrolled in 
the program. 
(b) The Criminal Investigations and Technical Services 
Division of the Department of Public Safety, 
established in Section 53-10-103, shall process that 
information to determine whether the individual has 
been convicted of any crime. 
(c) If an individual has not lived in Utah for five 
years, the individual shall submit fingerprints for a 
FBI national criminal history record check. The 
fingerprints shall be submitted to the FBI through the 
Criminal Investigations and Technical Services 
Division. 
(2) An owner, director, member of the governing body, 
employee, provider of care, or volunteer who has a felony 
conviction may not provide child placing services, foster 
care, youth programs, substitute care, or institutionalized 
care for children in facilities or programs licensed by the 
department. 
(3) The office shall adopt rules defining the circumstances 
under which an owner, director, member of the governing 
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who has been 
convicted of a misdemeanor may provide services described in 
Subsection(1)(a). 
ADDENDUM B 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
STATE OF UTAH 
Office of Licensing, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
SHAUN SORENSON, 
Respondent. 
This matter came for hearing before Mary A. Rudolph, Hearing Officer, on Thursday, the 
30th day of April, 1998. The record was left open for an indefinite period of time to allow the 
parties to appropriately brief the issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 30, 1998, Claimant filed a Notice of Agency action alleging that Respondent's 
license should be revoked due to employment of Shaun Sorenson, who had two felony convictions 
which were uncovered during a Criminal Background Screening. The Office of Administrative 
Hearings dismissed Respondent's initial hearing request but granted Respondent's Request for 
Reconsideration. Both parties then briefed the issue of whether U.C.A. § 62A-41-413 precludes 
the licensing of any facility which employees an individual who does not pass the BCI 
investigation or whether that provision only prevents employing such persons in programs dealing 
directly with children. 
FINDINGS 
The undersigned finds that the only sound interpretation of ILCLA, § 62A-4a-413 mandates 
that youth facilities licensed by Claimant may not employee persons who do not pass the criminal 
COPY 
ORDER DENYING 
REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
background screening whether they work directly with children, or, as in this case, work as 
custodians or in other positions which do not require direct interaction with children. The 
undersigned agrees with Claimant that the act must be analyzed in its entirety. The Legislature 
passed this Act with the specific purpose of protecting children. 
By including both "employee" and "providers of care" in the statute the Legislature meant 
to protect children from all persons who would have access to them. Custodians, cooks and other 
"employees" working in youth programs have access to children. Indeed, at times they may have 
greater and more secluded access to children than "providers of care" such as therapists. 
The undersigned hereby concludes that Respondent's Request for Reconsideration be 
denied. 
ORDER 
Respondent's Request for Reconsideration is hereby denied and Claimant's Notice of 
Agency Action is upheld. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW of this Order may be obtained by filing a Complaint in the Juvenile 
Court in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains his principal place of business within 
thirty (30) days after the date this Order was issued. A copy of said Complaint, if any, should be 
served upon each party to the action in accordance with the provisions inU.C.A. § 63-46b-15. 
us 5 Dated thi  U day of .QiAjAJUnA^ ,1999. 
MARY A. RUDOLPH 
a^yc 
Hearing Officer 
Department of Human Services 
120 North 200 West - Suite 122 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: 538-3900 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ & dayof S ^ ^ y y ^ ^ ^ — 1999, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of $gr foregoing Order Denying 
Request for Reconsideration to the following parties of record: 
Shaun Sorenson 
c/o Dale P. Eyre 
Attorney at Law 
175 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Dale P. Eyre 
Attorney at Law 
175 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Sorensons Ranch School 
P.O. Box 440219 
Koosharem, Utah 84744 
and to the following parties via inter-office mail: 
Department of Human Services 
Office of Licensing - Suite 209 
120 North 200 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attn: Darcy Anderson 
SECRETARY 
ADDENDUM C 
CAROL L. C. VERDOIA - #5049 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140833 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0833 
Telephone: (801) 366-0250 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SORENSON'S RANCH SCHOOL and 
SHAUN SORENSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF LICENSING, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON OPPOSING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MOTIONS 
Judge David L. Mower 
Civil No. 990600045 AA 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on 
August 29, 2000, the Honorable David L. Mower presiding, upon 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed the 
pleadings submitted by the parties and heard the arguments of 
counsel for both parties, enters the following order: 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. 
DATED this ^ day of September, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
U 
DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the I I ^ day of September, 
2000, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact 
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
to the following: 
Dale P. Eyre 
Attorney at Law 
175 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
ADDENDUM D 
Ch. 122 L a w s of U t a h - 1990 
CHAPTER 122 
H. B. No. 335 
Passed February 21, 1990 
Approved March 8, 1990 
Effective July 1, 1990 
CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS 
By Don E Bush 
Martin R. Stephens 
AN ACT RELATING TO FAMILY SERVICES; 
REPEALING CHILD ABUSE REGISTRY; 
PROVIDING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
INVESTIGATION FOR CHILD CARE EM-
PLOYEES; LIMITING EMPLOYMENT OF 
PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN 
LICENSED CHILD CARE FACILITIES; AND 
PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
62A-4-514, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 1, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1988 
REPEALS: 
62A^-512, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 1, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1988 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 62A-4-514, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
ai enacted by Chapter 1, Laws of Utah 1988, is 
amended to read: 
62A-4-614. Placement of children — Deter-
minat ion of no report of child abuse. 
U) [Each] As of July 1,1990, each public or private 
agency or individual [involved in placing children 
ml licensed by the department to provide day care 
services, child placing services, substitute, foster, or 
institutionalized care to children shall, [by submit-
twig] in order to obtain or renew a license under Sec-
tion 62A-2-108, submit the name and other identi-
fying information, including fingerprints, of [the) 
proposed [placement environment to the statewide 
central register, determine that a verified report of 
child abuse or neglect naming that proposed place 
ment as the responsible party, has not been mode. If 
such a verified report cxiots, the ehild may not be 
placed in that proposed placement cnvironment^m-
til a statement approving that placement has been 
obtained from the division. Failure to submit the 
necessary information to the statewide central rcg 
istcr prior to placement of a ehild may be grounds for 
suspension, revocation, or refusal to renew a child 
placement license.] employees, providers of care, 
and volunteers to the department. The Bureau of 
Criminal Identification shall process that informa-
tion to determine whether the individual has been 
convicted of any crime. 
(2) An employee, provider of care, or volunteer 
who has a felony conviction may not provide child 
care, child placing services, foster care, substitute 
care, or institutionalized care for children in facili-
ties or programs licensed by the department. 
(3) With regard to an employee or provider of care 
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive 
director has discretion to determine whether or not 
that person may be employed by any child careT 
child placing, foster care, substitute care, or institu-
tionalized care for children in a facility or program 
licensed by the department. 
Section 2. Repealer. 
Section 62A-4-512, Statewide central register, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 
1, Laws of Utah 1988, is repealed. 
Section 3. Effective Date. 
This act takes effect on July 1, 1990. 
, 4 0 0 
Laws of u t a n - i r a i t h . 192 
CHAPTER 192 
H.B. No. 196 
Passed February 25, 1991 
Approved March 16, 1991 
Effective April 29, 1991 
BACKGROUND CHECKS ON 
CHILD CARE WORKERS 
By Martin R Stephens 
AN ACT RELATING TO FAMILY SERVICES; 
CLARIFYING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
FOR CHILD CARE EMPLOYEES; AND PRO-
VIDING FOR CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYEES OF 
YOUTH PROGRAMS. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS. 
AMENDS: 
62A-4-514, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
122, LAWS OF UTAH 1990 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah. 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 62A-4-514, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 122, Laws ofUtah 1990, 
is amended to read: 
62A-4-514. Placement of children — Determi-
nation of no report of child abuse. 
(1) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private 
agency or individual licensed by the department to 
provide day care services, child placing services, 
youth programs, substitute, foster, or institutional-
ized care to children shall, in order to obtain or re-
new a license under Section 62A-2-108, submit to 
the department the name and other identifying m-
formation, including fingerprints, of new and pro-
posed: 
(a) employees^]; 
(b) providers of caret;]; and 
(c) volunteers [to the department]. 
The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall pro-
cess that information to determine whether the in-
dividual has been convicted of any crime. 
(2) An employee, provider of care, or volunteer 
who has a felony conviction may not provide child 
care, child placmg services, foster care, substitute 
care, or institutionalized care for children in facili-
ties or programs licensed by the department. 
(3) With regard to an employee or provider of care 
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive 
director has discretion to determine whether or not 
that person may be employed by any child care, 
child placmg, foster care, substitute care, or institu-
tionalized care for children m a facihty or program 
licensed by the department. 
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Ch. 225 Laws of Utah- 1992 
CHAPTER 225 
S. B. No. 148 
Passed February 26, 1992 
Approved March 13, 1992 
Effective July 1, 1992 
JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER AND VICTIM 
TREATMENT PROGRAM AND FUNDING 
By Delpha A. Baird 
AN ACT RELATING TO SOCIAL SERVICES; 
PROVIDING FOR COORDINATED SER-
VICES FOR AT RISK CHILDREN AND 
YOUTH ACT; ESTABLISHING STATEWIDE 
AND REGIONAL UNITS FOR THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF PROGRAMS FOR THE SU-
PERVISION AND TREATMENT OF JUVE-
NILE SEX OFFENDERS; ESTABLISHING 
THE AUTHORITY AND DUTIES OF THESE 
UNITS; APPROPRIATING $50,000 FROM 
THE GENERAL FUND TO THIS PROGRAM; 
REMOVING REQUIREMENT THAT LI-
CENSED AGENCIES OR INDIVIDUALS 
THAT PROVIDE CHILD CARE SERVICES 
SUBMIT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
TO THE BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFI-
CATION ON VOLUNTEERS; AND PROVID-
ING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
62A-t-514, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
192, LAWS OF UTAH 1991 
ENACTS: 
62A-7-301, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
62A-7-302, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
62A-7-303, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 62A-4-514, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 192, Laws of Utah 1991, 
is amended to read: 
62A-4-514. Placement of children — Determi-
nation of no report of child abuse. 
(1) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private 
agency or individual licensed by the department to 
provide day care services, child placing services, 
youth programs, substitute, foster, or institutional-
ized care to children shall, in order to obtain or re-
new a license under Section 62A-2-108, submit to 
the department the name and other identifying in-
formation, including fingerprints, of new and pro-
posed: 
(a) employees: 
(b) providers of care: and 
<c) volunteers, except parents of children enrolled 
in the programs. 
The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall pro-
cess that information to determine whether the in-
dividual has been convicted of any crime. 
(2) An employee, provider of care, or volunteer 
who has a felony conviction may not provide child 
care, child placing services, foster care, substitute 
care, or institutionalized care for children in facili-
ties or programs licensed by the department. 
(3) With regard to an employee or provider of care 
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive 
director has discretion to determine whether or not 
that person may be employed by any child care, 
child placing, foster care, substitute care, or institu-
tionalized care for children in a facility or program 
licensed by the department. 
Section 2. Section Enacted. 
Section 62A-7-301, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is enacted to read: 
62A-7-301. Juvenile sex offender unit — Pur-
pose — Members — Duties — Staff special-
ists. 
(1) There is established within the Department of 
Human Services, the Division of Youth Corrections, 
a statewide juvenile sex offender supervision and 
treatment unit which is a pilot program existing 
from July 1,1992 through June 30,1995. This state-
wide unit shall involve the coordinated efforts of the 
Division of Family Services, the Division of Youth 
Corrections, and juvenile court probation. 
(a) The purposes of the statewide unit are to: 
(i) promote the protection of children by the early 
identification, supervision, and treatment of juve-
nile sex offenders: 
(ii) research supervision and treatment programs 
of juvenile sex offenders and evaluate their effec-
tiveness; 
(iii) foster the development of effective supervi-
sion and treatment programs for juvenile sex of-
fenders; 
(iv) establish standards for the diagnosis, classifi-
cation, supervision, and treatment of juvenile sex 
offenders; 
(v) develop and conduct annual training seminars 
to be available to members of regional units as es-
tablished in Section 62A-7-302 and to personnel of 
the Division of Family Services, the Division of 
Youth Corrections, the juvenile court, law enforce-
ment, and prosecutors involved with the investiga-
tion, supervision, and treatment of juvenile sex of-
fenders; 
(vi) coordinate the work of regional units; 
(vii) manage funds; 
(viii) apply for public and private grants: and 
(ix) report annually in October to the Judiciary In-
terim Committee, the governor, and the Judicial 
Council. 
<b) The statewide unit shall consist of one repre-
sentative selected by the executive director and the 
presiding officer of the Judicial Council, respective-j -
(i) the Division of Family Services: 
R42 
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CHAPTER 109 
H. B. 82 
Passed February 15, 1995 
Approved March 10, 1995 
Effective May 1,1995 
BACKGROUND SCREENING 
REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CHILD SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Sponsor: David M. Jones 
AN ACT RELATING TO HUMAN SERVICES; 
CLARIFYING FINGERPRINTING RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR CHILD SERVICE 
PROVIDERS. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
62A-4a-413, as renumbered and amended by 
Chapter 260, Laws of Utah 1994 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 62A-4a-413 is amended 
to read: 
62A-4a-413. Agencies and individuals 
providing services to children — Felony or 
misdemeanor conviction. 
(1) (a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private 
agency or individual licensed by the department to 
provide [day] child care services, child placing 
services, youth programs, substitute, foster, or 
institutionalized care to children shall, in order to 
obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108, 
submit to the department the name and other 
identifying information, which may include 
fingerprints, of new and proposed: 
(Downers; 
(ii) directors; 
(Hi) members of the governing body; 
[te4] (iv) employees; 
[&)] (v) providers of care; and 
M\ (vi) volunteers, except parents of children 
enrolled in the programs. 
(b) The Law Enforcement and Technical Services 
Division of the Department of Public Safety shall 
process that information to determine whether the 
individual has been convicted of any crime. 
(2) An owner, director, member of the governing 
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who 
has a felony conviction may not provide child care, 
child placing services, foster care, youth programs. 
substitute care, or institutionalized care for 
children in facilities or programs licensed by the 
department. 
(3) With regard to an owner, director, member of 
the governing body, employee, or provider of care 
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive 
director has discretion to determine whether or not 
that person may (bo employod by) provide any child 
care, child placing, foster care, youth programs. 
substitute care, or institutionalized care for 
children in a facility or program licensed by the 
department. 
383 
General Session - 1997 Ch. 329 
^tion 14. Section 62A-4a-250 is enacted to 
read: 
part 2A. Minors in Custody on Grounds 
Other Than Abuse or Neglect 
b^\-4a-250. Separate programs and 
-^focedures for minors committed to the 
custody of the Division of Child and 
Family Services on grounds other than 
abuse or neglect. 
(D On or before July 1, 1998. the division shall 
have established programs designed to meet tHe 
^eds of minors who have not been adjudicated as 
lEused or neglected, but who are otherwise 
^mmitted to the custody of the division by the 
juvenile court pursuant to Section 78-3a-U8, and 
R^o are classified in the division's management 
information system as having been placed In 
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent 
behavior or a status offense. 
(2) (a) The processes and procedures designed to 
meet the needs of children who are abused "or 
neglected, described in Part 2 and in Title 78, 
Chapter 3a, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and 
Dependency Proceedings, are not applicable to the 
minors described in Subsection (1). 
(b) The procedures described in Subsection 
7a-3a-119(2Xa) are applicable to the minors 
described in Subsection (1). 
Section 15. Section 62A-4a-413 is amended 
to read: 
62A-4a-413. Agencies and individuals 
providing services to children — Felony or 
misdemeanor conviction. 
(1) (a) As of July 1,1990, each public or private 
agency or individual licensed by the department to 
provide child care services, child placing services, 
youth programs, substitute, foster, or 
institutionalized care to children shall, in order to 
obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108, 
submit to the department the name and other 
identifying information, which may include 
fingerprints, of new and proposed: 
(i) owners; 
(ii) directors; 
(iii) members of the governing body; 
(iv) employees; 
(v) providers of care; and 
(vi) volunteers, except parents of children 
enrolled in the programs. 
(b) The Law Enforcement and Technical Services 
Division of the Department of Public Safety shall 
process that information to determine whether the 
individual has been convicted of any crime. 
(c) As of July 1, 1997, persons described in 
Subsection < lXa) may also be subject to a complete 
Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal 
background check through the national criminal 
history system (NCIC) if they provide out-of-home 
care for children, in accordance with Section 
78-3a-307.1. If an FBI fingerprint background 
check is required pursuant to Section 78-3a-3Q7.1, 
the provider may be provisionally licensed. 
(2) An owner, director, member of the governing 
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who 
has a felony conviction may not provide child care, 
child placing services, foster care, youth programs, 
substitute care, or institutionalized care for 
children in facilities or programs licensed by the 
department. 
(3) With regard io an owner, director, member of 
the governing body, employee, or provider of care 
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive 
director has discretion to determine whether or not 
that person may provide any child care, child 
placing, foster care, youth programs, substitute 
care, or institutionalized care for children in a 
facility or program licensed by the department. 
Section 16. Section 62A-4a-607 is amended 
to read: 
62A-4a-607. Promotion of adoption. 
(1) The division and all agencies licensed under 
this-part shall promote adoption when that is a 
possible and appropriate alternative for a child. 
Specifically, the division shall actively promote the 
adoption of all children in its custody who have a 
[permanency goal ofl final plan for termination of 
parental rights pursuant to Section 78-3a-312, or a 
permanency goal of adoption (and who are eligible 
for adoptieaj! 
(2) The division shall obtain or conduct research 
of prior adoptive families to determine what 
families may do to be successful with their adoptive 
children and shall make this research available to 
potential adoptive parents. 
8ection 17. Section 62A-12-282.1 is amended 
to read: 
62A-12-282.1. Residential and inpatient 
settings — Commitment proceeding — 
Child in physical custody of local mental 
health authority. 
(1) A child may receive services from a local 
mental health authority in an inpatient or 
residential setting only after a commitment 
proceeding, for the purpose of transferring physical 
custody, has been conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of this section. 
(2) That commitment proceeding shall be 
initiated by a petition for commitment, and shall be 
a careful, diagnostic inquiry, conducted by a neutral 
and detached fact finder, pursuant to the 
procedures and requirements of this section. If the 
findings described in Subsection (4) exist, the 
proceeding shall result in the transfer of physical 
custody to the appropriate local mental health 
authority, and the child may be placed in an 
inpatient or residential setting. 
(3) The neutral and detached fact finder who 
conducts the inquiry: 
(a) shall be a designated examiner, as defined in 
Subsection 62A-12-202(3); and 
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(b) inspection and compliance with all provisions 
of this chapter and applicable rules. 
(2) The office may only suspend a license for a 
period of time which does not exceed the current 
expiration date of that license. 
(3) When a license has been suspended, the office 
may completely or partially restore the suspenaed 
license upon a determination that the: 
(a) conditions upon which the suspension was 
based have been completely or partially corrected; 
and 
(b) interests of the public will not be jeopardized 
by restoration of the license. 
Section 14. Section 62A-2-115 is amended 
to read: 
62A-2-115. Injunctive relief and other legal 
procedures. 
In addition to, and notwithstanding, any other 
remedy provided by law the department may, in a 
manner provided by law and upon the advice of the 
attorney general, who shall represent the 
department in the proceedings, maintain an action 
in the name of the state for injunction or other 
process against any person or governmental unit to 
restrain or prevent the establishment, 
management, or operation of a human services 
program or facility in violation of this chapter or 
rules (aaade-1 approved by the [committee] board. 
Section 15. Section 62A-2-116 is amended 
to read: 
62A-2-116. Violation — Criminal penalties. 
A person who owns, establishes, conducts, 
maintains, manages, or operates a human services 
[pregraaftOE] facility in violation of this chapter (e* 
rules made by the committee] is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor if the violation endangers or harms 
the health, welfare, or safety of persons 
participating in that program. 
Section 16. Section 62A-2-117 is enacted to 
read: 
62A-2-117. Licensure of tribal foster homes. 
(1) The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C Sees 
1901-1963, provides that tribes may develop and 
implement tribal foster home standards" 
(2) The office shall license tribal foster homes 
according to standards developed and approved by 
the tribe, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 
25 U.S.C. Sees 1901-196T 
(3) If the tribe has not developed standards, the 
office shall license tribal foster homes pursuant to 
this chapter 
Section 17. Section 62A-2-118 is enacted to 
read: 
62A-2-118. Administrative inspections. 
(1) The office may, for the purpose of ascertaining 
compliance with the provisions of this cnapter 
enter and inspect on a routine basis the facilf* 
licensee ~" " -—-£j£* 
(2) Before conducting an inspecting
 Xi^^ 
Subsection (1), the office shall, aiter iQenTI?£^£ 
person in charge: " ' -212* 
(a) give proper identification; 
(b) request to see the applicable license: 
(c) describe the nature and purpose of tfc. 
inspection; and "" ' -— 
(d) if necessary, explain the authority of the nff^ 
to conduct the inspection and the penalty l£ 
refusing to permit the inspection as provided""m 
Section 62A-2-U6. " •—-
(3) In conducting an inspection under Subsection 
(1), the office may, after meeting the requirement! 
of Subsection (2): ~" " ' 
(a) inspect the physical facilities; 
(b) inspect records and documents; 
(c) interview officers, employees, clients, family 
members of clients, and others; and 
(d) observe the licensee in operation. 
(4) An inspection conducted under Subsection (1) 
shall be dunng regular business hours and maybe 
announced or unannounced. 
(5) The human services licensee shall make 
copies of inspection reports available to the public 
upon request. 
(6) The provisions of this section apply to on-site 
inspections and do not restrict the office from 
contacting family members, neighbors, or other 
individuals, or from seeking information from other 
sources to determine compliance with the 
provisions of this chapter. 
Section 18. Section 62A-2-119 is enacted to 
read: 
62A-2-119. Adoption of inspections, 
examinations, and studies. 
The office may adopt an inspection, examination, 
or study conducted by a public or private entity, as 
identified by rule, to determine whether a licensee 
has complied with a licensing requirement imposed 
by virtue of this chapter." 
Section 19. Section 62A-2-120 is enacted to 
read: 
62A-2-120. Criminal background checks. 
(1) (a) A human services licensee or individual 
applying for or renewing a license to provide 
child-placing services, youth programs, substitute 
care, foster care, or institutionalized care to 
children, shall submit to the department the name 
and other identifying information, which may 
include fingerprints, of persons associated with the 
licensee 
(b) The Utah Division of Criminal I nvesttgation of 
the Department of Public safety snail process that 
information to determine whether tne individual 
has been convicted of anv crime 
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jividuai shall submit fmgerpnnts for a fheina 
^rr^nonal criminal history record checfc. The 
r
^7mMnts snail be submitted to the FBI througn 
division of Cnminal Investigation. 
0) A person associated with the licensee who has 
H^v"*conviction may not provide child-placing 
^r^T""Foster care, youth programs, substitute 
'--j—^r institutionalized care for children in 
r^ T7ties"or programs licensed by the department. 
3) The department shall adopt rules defining the 
r^ Tmstances under which a person who has been 
.'Evicted of a misdemeanor may provide 
^•f j.placing services, foster care, youth programs^ 
-TTSstitute care, or institutionalized care foT 
;QcIren in a facility or program licensed by the 
department. 
Section 20. Section 62A-2-121 is enacted to 
read: 
62A-2-121. Access to abuse and neglect 
information for licensing purposes. 
(1) With respect to human services licensees, the 
department may access only the Division of ChifcT 
and Family Service's management informaticin 
system created by Section 62A-4a-U6 for the 
purpose of: 
(a) determining whether a person associated with 
a licensee, who provides care described in 
Subsection (2), has a substantiated finding of abuse 
or neglect; and 
(b) informing a licensee, who provides care 
described in Subsection (2), that a person associate? 
with the licensee has a substantiated finding o? 
abuse or neglect. 
(2) (a) A licensee or individual applying for or 
renewing a license to provide child-placing 
services, youth programs, substitute care, foster 
care, or institutionalized care to children shall 
submit to the department the name and other 
identifying information of a person associated witR" 
the licensee" 
(b) The office shall process the information to 
determine whether the licensee or a person 
associated with a licensee has a substantiate? 
finding of child abuse or neglecT 
(3) The office shall adopt rules defining the 
circumstances under which a person who has a 
substantiated finding of child abuse or neglect may 
provide child-placing services, foster care, youth 
programs, substitute care, or institutionalized care 
tor children in a facility licenced by the department? 
Section 21. Section 62A~4a-413 is amended 
to read: 
62A-4a-413. Agencies and individuals 
providing services to children — Felony or 
misdemeanor conviction. 
agency or individual licensed by the department to 
provide child placing services, youth programs, 
substitute, foster, or institutionalized care to 
children shall, in order to obtain or renew a license 
under Section 62A-2-108, submit to the 
department the name and other identifying 
information, which may include fmgerpnnts, of 
new and proposed: 
(i) owners; 
(ii) directors; 
(iii) members of the governing body; 
(iv) employees; 
(v) providers of care; and 
(vi) volunteers, except parents of children 
enrolled in the programs. 
(b) The [Law Enforcement—and Technical 
Services) Utah Division of Criminal Investigation of 
the Department of Public Safety shall process that 
information to determine whether the individual 
has been convicted of any crime. 
(c) If an individual has not lived in Utah for five 
years, the individual shall submit fingerprints fora 
FBI national criminal history record check. The 
fingerprints shall be submitted to the FBI through 
the Utah Division of Criminal Investigation. 
[(e)—As ef July 1, 1007, persons described in 
Subsection (l)(a) may also be subject to a complete 
Federal—Bureau ef—Investigation criminal 
background cheek through the national criminal 
history system (NCIC) if they provide out-ef-home 
care for children, in accordance with Section 
78-3a 3Q7.1. If an FBI fingerprint background 
check is required pursuant to Section 78-3a-3Q7.1, 
the provider may be provisionally licensed!] 
(2) An owner, director, member of the governing 
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who 
has a felony conviction may not provide child 
placing services, foster care, youth programs, 
substitute care, or institutionalized care for 
children in facilities or programs licensed by the 
department. 
[(3) With regard to an owner, director, member ef 
the governing body, employee, or provider ef care 
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive 
director has discretion te determine whether or net 
that person may provide any child placing, fester 
ea*e,—youth programs, substitute care,—OF 
institutionalised care for children in a facility or 
program licensed by the department.] 
(3) The Office shall adopt rules defining the 
circumstances under which an owner, director, 
member of the governing body, employee, provider 
of care, or volunteer who has been convicted of a 
misdemeanor may provide services described in 
Subsection (l)(a). 
Section 22. Repealer. 
This act repeals: 
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